going on in the field. That was his tremendous advantage.

Favre knew comparatively little about the military situation; he was not a military man, and besides that he had been in a beleaguered city, cut off from all communication for weeks. His fatal error was not to have summoned Gambetta or one of Gambetta's entourage to advise him. The war, indeed, must have ended in German victory, but a good deal might have been saved.

Under these conditions, with one antagonist blindfolded, the game began.

Favre asserted, for an opening statement, that Paris had enough supplies to last six months.

Bismarck permitted himself to show amusement.

The garrison was about to make a sortie in force, M. Favre continued gravely; the battle would be sanguinary. To avoid useless losses, he, M. Favre, proposed to surrender if favorable terms could be arranged, including the honors of war for the French defenders.

Bismarck stopped smiling and got down to business. He swept Favre off his feet. He would hear of no surrender of the capital without the condition of an armistice to be observed throughout France, an armistice preliminary to peace negotiations. He informed M. Favre of the exact state of desperation in Paris; it was useless to try to fool him on that score. Steps toward victorious peace were what the soldiers demanded; he could not refuse; victorious peace, or the war must go on.

Neat Counter by M. Favre.

M. Favre countered rather neatly. Had not the Iron Chancellor asserted stoutly not long before to M. Thiers that the Council of National Defence had no authority to make peace; that it was a makeshift, hedgerow conglomeration of "madmen," incapable of signing a treaty?

That would have been a poser to another man. But Bismarck had an adroit answer.

"Yes," he said, in effect, "it is true that you cannot make peace. But as the head of the military force you can conclude a military truce. During the truce elections can be called and delegates to the National Assembly elected. I will recognize the Assembly as a duly constituted Government, and will conclude a peace with it, if it desires to make peace."

All this was not a matter of a five minute talk. It was instead six days work. Favre went back and forth between Versailles and Paris. Toward the end of the week he learned that there had been a tragic miscalculation of the amount of flour on hand; Paris was ten days nearer actual starvation than had been estimated. Negotiations moved more swiftly from that time forward.

Favre took two advisers from the council back to Versailles with him. He might have taken the whole Government along for all the difference it made. So on January 28, at 8 o'clock at night, the order to cease firing was given. The siege of Paris was at an end.

Bismarck was anxious to have Belfort in German hands when it came time to draw up the definitive peace treaty. So he demanded its surrender as part of the terms of the truce. Favre would not concede this. So Bismarck haggled.

Bismarck Plays Old Trick.

Probably this was one of the times when he played his favorite trick—excused himself from the conference on the ground that this was a matter that exceeded his authority and that he must consult the Emperor himself.

He never went any further than a nearby room, where he enjoyed one of his famous cigars at leisure and thought out a scheme.

"Very well," he told Favre upon his return. "His Majesty will not insist upon the surrender of Belfort. But neither will he consent to an armistice in that quarter. The truce shall not apply to Belfort. Let them fight it out over there." These were not his words, of course, but the sense of them.

Whereupon Jules Favre, still blindfolded, insisted upon what he thought was perfect fairness, that if Gen. Werder was to continue the siege of Belfort Gen. Bourbaki must be allowed to continue his operations in that region. Bismarck, with a great show of reluctance, no doubt, conceded the point. So the armistice, drawing a line between the armies in the north and west and establishing a ten kilometer neutral zone between their outposts, expressly excepted the east of France in the following terms:

"The military operations in the territory of the Departments of Doubs, Jura and Cote d'Or, as well as the siege of Belfort, shall continue independently of the armistice, until an agreement shall be arrived at regarding the line of demarcation, the tracing of which through the three de[illegible] has been reserved for an ulterior understanding."

Add to this that the Paris forts were to be garrisoned by the Germans and that the defenders of Paris, so far from being allowed to march out with the honors of war, were to be made prisoners of war within the city, with the exception only of a body to act as police—not half enough, by the way, to stem the rising tide of disaffection in the National Guard and among the Red Republicans—and we cannot help but picture Bismarck smiling like the cat that ate the canary.

Three corps of the Army of the Loire had been put under Bourbaki, and with other forces under him his command was named (very inappropriately) the First Army of the Loire, to distinguish it from the other Army of the Loire. Gambetta had sent Bourbaki—a man of Greek origin, a good corps commander, but unfitted for supreme authority—eastward, announcing that Bourbaki would raise the siege of Belfort and invade Germany.

So much Favre knew. Bourbaki had 133,000 men and 300 guns. Gen. Werder, the Prussian commander, had some 40,000 men. The French negotiators naturally had great hopes.

But Bismarck knew Bourbaki was trapped and beaten. He spoke for an army, for the General Staff.

For, no doubt foreseeing the armistice and being pretty well able to forecast its terms, Field Marshal von Moltke had withdrawn an important part of his forces before Paris and sent them under Gen. Fransecky to put an end to Bourbaki.

Bourbaki encountered Gen. Werder when the former attempted to march on Belfort and a battle ensued with heavy losses on both sides. But the French, badly provisioned, actually without food for two days, were unable to attack with the necessary vigor and Bourbaki retired.

Then Fransecky fell upon him and Bourbaki lost 12,000 captured besides a train of more than 200 baggage wagons. The General, who had been betrayed in all innocence by the negotiators at Paris, attempted to commit suicide but was dissuaded. Eventually he was forced with most of his army across the Swiss frontier, where perforce they were interned. Belfort fell in February.

Thus Bismarck attained his end, which was to hold Belfort, so to speak, for ransom by other territorial concessions. Furthermore he had enabled the German High Command to dispose effectually of France's most formidable remaining threat.

France Lacked Heart to Go On.

France was heartbroken. A Napoleon I. might have gone on, historians since have asserted, for there was ample man power to be drawn upon and the ordnance factories were turning out arms at a great rate with the necessary ammunition. All France lacked was the heart and the Corsican—which, after all, is another way of saying she lacked everything that really mattered.

Remained only to elect the National Assembly with which Bismarck was willing to deal, and to conclude a peace, if the national plebiscite should vote peace.

As if there could be any doubt of that! Gabriel Hanotaux cites authority to show that Prussian officers posted the lists of candidates in many towns in occupied territory. They rattled the sabre and shook their fists. They supervised the voting. The result was the election of an Assembly composed largely of doddering, cowed old men.

"A chamber of ghosts of people who were thought to be dead long ago," said one of the Red Republicans in a contemporaneous pamphlet. "This Assembly ought to have had a grave digger for doorkeeper."

Satisfied with the result of his work and with the aspect of this timorous gathering, Bismarck extended the armistice once, and again, announcing the last time that any more delays would bring on a resumption of the war. Thus driven into a corner, the preliminaries of peace were signed February 26, a peace negotiated with a pistol at the victim's head, a twitching finger on the trigger.

Both the preliminary and the definitive treaty of peace were profoundly influenced by Prussian bullying and cleverness; but that is another and better known story.

What wonder the Commune broke out as a sort of desperate protest? The Germans cynically watched Frenchmen killing one another. They stopped the return of prisoners of war, which had been agreed upon to take place at once, and thus denied the Provisional Government the use of trained and loyal troops. Bismarck used the Commune again when he professed to believe it might triumph, voiding the treaty, thus again putting the screws on M. Thiers and his associates.

Moltke's Cold Comment.

"The Germans could have easily and quickly put an end to the matter," coldly remarked Count von Moltke in his memoirs. "But what Government would allows its rights to be established by foreign bayonets?"

Instead he barred the gates of Paris and shifted menacingly the position of his forces before the city. Meanwhile German high officers in mufti were slipping in and out of the city for their own purposes.

Perhaps there will be a Commune in Berlin when the German people learn the hard conditions of peace which will be imposed upon their junker ridden Government. And surely the Imperial German Government will not desire to see order restored by foreign bayonets. It is on record against such a procedure.

The difference between the end of this war and the end of the Franco-Prussian will be that we shall not in this peace treaty build what M. Thiers described as "One of those monuments of a human weakness which does not know how to stop in success and which, perpetuating in peace the passions of war, deposits fresh germs of hostility even in the treaties destined to bring it to an end."

For was it not Bismarck himself who brutally told Viscount de Gontaut-Biron, France's first envoy to Berlin after the war, that he knew full well he had no business to take Alsace and Lorraine, which were bound to be a source of trouble to Germany?

"If this were a permanent peace we would not have done it," he went on. But there was going to be another war, he said, when Germany would need the stolen provinces for strategic reasons.

Rapid Rise of E. W. Beatty

AT 41 years of age Edward Wentworth Beatty, K. C., the newly elected president of the Canadian Pacific Railway, finds himself at the head of a corporation controlling 18,233 miles of railroads, a transcontinental telegraph system, a fleet of more than ninety steamships and millions of acres of land.

Born in Thorold, Ont., October 16, 1877, he was called to the bar in 1901, was made assistant in the law department of the Canadian Pacific a month later and in seventeen years has risen to his present post as president. From the very start he buried himself and his interests in the railway and its interests. He worked for it and for nobody else, not even consciously for himself. He became one of the legal watchdogs of the company. In nine years he was general solicitor, in twelve he was general counsel, in thirteen he was a King's counsellor, in fourteen a director and in fifteen a vice-president of the road. Thus he rose.

Running a great railroad's law department is no easy task. Between the Atlantic and the Pacific there are millions of dollars of property scattered along those 18,233 miles of Canadian Pacific trackage, and there are millions of people having transactions with the company. From those transactions arise many problems for the company's legal guardians. Even a small matter may become a very expensive and undesirable precedent. Unceasing vigilance is needed to prevent encroachments and raids on the company's treasury.

The Canadian Pacific is not a Government owned or controlled road, and yet it has a wonderful record in making munitions, the profits of which have been given to patriotic and relief funds, and in transporting hundreds of thousands of soldiers and thousands of tons of munitions across land and sea.

President Beatty is a son of Henry and Harriet M. (Powell) Beatty. He was educated at Upper Canada College, Model School, Toronto; Harbord Collegiate Institute, Toronto; Toronto University and Osgoode Hall Law School. He was and still is an athlete with a fondness for golf and hunting. He is a member of a dozen of the best known clubs in Canada, is a Presbyterian and a resident of Montreal.



A Sunday Crime

"FOR a man to get his hair cut on a Sunday morning may not be classified as a crime in the Criminal Code, but," said Mr. Blinkinton, "it is nevertheless a crime against his fellow man.

"You go into, say, a six chair shop on a Sunday morning and find every chair occupied and five customers waiting, you yourself making the sixth. Now that looks as if you would have to wait a long time; but really if the men in the chairs were simply getting shaves and they were on an average half way through when you came in, why, your turn would come in six or eight minutes; but——

"Looking along the chairs now after you have walked into this shop you see one barber taking the head rest out of his chair; his customer is going to have his hair cut—on Sunday morning! And now when I look along I see two other men equally thoughtless of the rights or convenience of other people getting their hair cut; and one of these men not only has his hair cut, but he gets a shampoo and an electric massage as well as a shave, sitting there in the chair with great complacency as the barber works over him, while all the exasperated waiting customers sit and fume inwardly, whatever their display of outward calm.

"And so these three men who elect to get their hair cut on Sunday morning slow up the shop's entire schedule and make customers who have come in to get shaved wait three times as long as they ought to.

"When would I have a man get his hair cut? Well, I wouldn't undertake to say about that; but I certainly would not have him pick out the barber shop's busiest time in the whole week, Sunday morning."